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Abstract. 
The racially aggravated offences created by the 1998 Act (later extended to religious 
aggravation)  were based on a rather arbitrary selection of underlying crimes and 
have proved difficult to interpret and apply for a number of reasons. Moreover, the 
relationship between the aggravated offences and the more general  duty to increase 
the sentence for any offence where there is racial (or religious)  aggravation is 
problematical. This  is illustrated by the common misunderstandings of the case law 
on the degree of mutual exclusivity between the crimes underlying the aggravated 
offences  and the more general aggravated sentencing provisions.  In the context of 
the question referred by the government to the Law Commission, as to whether the 
aggravated offences should be extended further to include a number of  other grounds 
of aggravation, it is argued that this would be counter-productive and that their 
further extension would  lead to even greater confusion and complexity. It is 
suggested that the preferable course would be to abolish the aggravated offences and 
to focus on a broader and better articulated sentencing provision of general 
application which would be all the more effective  without the complications of its 
uncertain relationship with an anomalously selected group of aggravated offences. 
 
 
 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 marked a new departure in English Law, creating 
for the first time a range of specific offences whose raison d’etre was that they were 
racially aggravated variations of existing offences. The provisions in sections 29-32 of 
the 1998 Act, and the offences created thereby can be distinguished from previous 
legislative attempts to deal with racial hatred directly such as the creation of the 
completely new offence in the Race Relations Act of 1965 of inciting racial hatred 
which proved difficult to enforce and subject to worries concerning its impact on 
freedom of expression1.  They also went a step further than the results of earlier 
pressure to create an offence of racially motivated violence in the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 which the government of the day resisted, instead creating 
the offence of intentionally causing a person harassment, alarm or distress2 which 
could cover racial harassment but which did not require or depend on any specific 
motivation of the offender, whether racial or otherwise. A distinction has also to be 
drawn between the specific offences based on racial aggravation created by the 1998 
Act  and the more general provision in s.82 of the same Act (now to be found in s.145 
of the CJA 2003) providing for racial aggravation in relation to any other offence to 
be compulsorily treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing (thus confirming the 
approach to sentencing racially aggravated crimes of violence enunciated in Ribbans3 
1995 16 Cr App Rep (S)  698).  
 
In contrast to all these provisions outlined above, the essence of the offences created 
in ss. 29-32 of the 1998 Act was that they were all parasitical on existing offences of 
1 See now ss. 18-23 of   Public Order Act 1986 
2 Inserted as s 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 
3 1995 16 Cr App Rep (S)  698 
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violence, criminal damage  or  harassment but with the added ingredient of racial 
aggravation which became part of the definition of the offence and which, 
significantly, had  to be proved before conviction rather than simply brought in as  an 
aggravating factor to be taken account of at the sentencing  stage. What were the 
reasons behind creating these very specific offences and for adopting the structure 
given to them in 1998, how have they been interpreted and what have been the 
difficulties and developments associated with them over the past 15 years and what 
lessons can be learned from this experience in shaping the future development of the 
criminal law in combating hate crime more generally? The last of these questions has 
become particularly pertinent in the light of the Law Commission’s announcement in 
December 2012 that it had been asked by the government to review whether the 
provisions ought to be extended to include hostility based on disability, sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Before considering this last question, the history and 
development of the existing offences will be analysed so as to provide an informed 
basis for the debate.  
 
 
The range of offences selected. 
 
The legislation was the result of growing awareness in the 1990’s of the problems of 
racial violence 4 and harassment and significant increases in the number of racial 
incidents recorded under a variety of definitions. The Labour party included in its 
manifesto for the 1997 General Election a commitment to create new offences of 
racially motivated violence and racial harassment. Following its election in May of 
that year, a Home Office Consultation paper, Racial Violence and Harassment was 
issued and the proposals therein constituted the basis of the racially aggravated 
offences selected in the Act. These can be summarised as follows (in each case the 
offence has to be “racially aggravated” for the purposes of s.28 of the Act, the 
meaning of which expression will be examined subsequently); 
 
Racially aggravated offences initially created by ss. 29-32 of the 1998 Act 
(indicating also the increase in maximum penalty available on trial on 
indictment as compared with the maximum available for basic offence 
underlying the racially aggravated offence) 
 
s.29(1)    (a) an offence under s.20 OAPA 1861 (malicious wounding or 
grievous bodily harm)  (5 years increased to 7 years) 
  
(b) an offence under s.47 OAPA 1861 (actual bodily harm)  
(5 years increased to 7 years) 
 
 (c) common assault  (6 months increased to 2 years) 
 
s.30(1) an offence under s.1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 
(criminal damage) (10 years increased to 14 years) 
 
 
4 Awareness  generated by the Stephen Lawrence case  of 1993 was significant even before the 
publication of the McPherson Report in 1999 
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s.31(1) (a) an offence under s. 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 (fear or 
provocation of violence) (6 months increased to 2 years) 
 
 (b) an offence under s. 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 
(intentional harassment alarm or distress) (6 months increased 
to 2 years) 
 
 (c)  an offence under s. 5  of the Public Order Act 1986 
(harassment alarm or distress)  
(summary only and remained so– fine increased from level 3 
[£1000 max]  to level 4 [£2,500 max]) 
 
s.32(1) (a) an offence under s.2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 (harassment) (6 months increased to 2 years) 
 
 (b) an offence under s.4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 (putting in fear of violence) (5 years increased to 7 years) 
 
 
 
It should be noted that originally the racially aggravated offence of criminal damage 
under s.30 was not included in the proposals which were aimed as those offences 
directed in a broad sense against the person. However this provision was added to the 
Bill at 3rd reading in March 1998 as it was pointed out that racially motivated offences 
of criminal damage are very often directed towards the owner or occupier of  property 
or indeed designed to terrorise or harass or dismay  members of racial groups 
irrespective of  who owned the property. The example was given of racist graffiti on 
bus shelters and there was also reference to the killing of Stephen Lawrence and the 
fact that a plaque erected in his memory had been vandalised. 
 
The question of why the above offences were selected to be given distinct racially 
aggravated versions is in some ways best answered by looking at what offences were 
not selected. In particular the fact that s.20 OAPA (malicious wounding or inflicting 
GBH) is included but s.18 (wounding or causing GBH with intent) is left out is 
noticeable and significant. The reason was explained by the Home Office Minister in 
during the passage of the Bill as follows 
 
 “Where the basic offence already carries a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment as under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861, the racially aggravated offence is not in practical terms required as the 
sentence cannot be increased. In other words, there is nothing to be gained, if 
there is no increased sentence, in placing the additional burden on the Crown 
Prosecution Service to meet the racially aggravated test. For that reason [also], 
we have not included murder and manslaughter in the list of offences.”5 
 
The fact that the racial aggravation could thus be taken into account under the general 
sentencing provision given statutory force in s.82 therefore meant that s.18, with its 
5 Alun Michael, Home Office Minister of State, Hansard, Commons, Standing Committee B 12 May, 
1998, col 325 
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maximum of life, (and a fortiori, murder, with its mandatory life penalty), did not 
need a specific offence in aggravated form. This approach is not entirely 
unproblematic as it suggests that the only reason for enacting the specific offences is 
to increase the available sentence, ignoring arguably at least equally powerful 
considerations of denunciation which would justify the creation of  specific offences. 
Furthermore, it creates some unfortunate anomalies and practical problems to do with 
alternative verdicts and charging practice 6 . If there is evidence both of racial 
aggravation and of the specific intent to cause gbh required under s.18, prosecution 
under s.18 will be appropriate but if the jury are not in the event persuaded of the 
intent to cause gbh, only a normal s.20 charge will be automatically available as  an 
alternative verdict even though the racial aggravation element is very clear. The 
prosecution, in order to  avoid this may and probably should include the racially 
aggravated s.20 offence in the indictment  but this may give the wrong signals to the 
accused that the prosecution are willing to accept a plea to the racially aggravated s.20 
(maximum 7 years) where there is in fact good evidence of a serious  s.18 offence 
plus racial aggravation also to be taken into account at the sentencing stage (for which 
the sentence may in principle be anything up to life). It may also confuse a jury who  
will have to be told that they can ignore the racial aggravation in deciding whether the 
more serious s.18 offence is made out but have to consider it in relation to s.20 where 
however there is no need to be satisfied of the intent to cause gbh. If the jury consider 
the racial aggravation to be the most serious aspect of a bad case they may be tempted 
to convict of the s.20 offence to reflect the racial aggravation explicitly rather than of 
the more serious s.18 offence which does not refer to racial aggravation even though 
they think there was an intent to cause gbh (of course logically in this situation they 
should convict of both the s18 offence and the racially aggravated s.20 but they may 
not fully understand the logic of this.)  A much clearer and more logically structured 
arrangement would have been to enact a racially aggravated version of s.18 as well as 
s.20 so that these anomalies and practical problems could have been eliminated. 
Indeed amendments during the passage of the Act were moved to do just this but were 
rejected7.  
 
Similar issues can potentially arise in relation to the aggravated public order offence   
based on s.4 of the Public Order Act 1986. The basic non-aggravated offences under 
the Public Order Act are expressly made alternative verdicts to their new aggravated 
forms. However the more serious public order offences of violent disorder and affray 
do not have racially aggravated versions and whilst an ordinary offence under s.4 of 
the Public Order Act (fear or provocation of violence) is an alternative verdict to 
either violent disorder or affray, there is no provision for the aggravated s.4 offence to 
be an alternative verdict to violent disorder of affray. Thus if there is evidence of 
violent  disorder or affray and of racial aggravation, whilst the racial aggravation can 
be taken into account in sentencing on either of those offences, if the actual 
conviction is of s.4 as an alternative verdict e.g. because there is no threat of unlawful 
violence, the racially aggravated version cannot be used because it is not made an 
alternative verdict and there is a further potential problem in  reflecting the racial 
aggravation in the sentencing for the basic s.4 offence because there is in existence 
the aggravated s.4 offence which should have been charged if racial aggravation is 
alleged. Furthermore, if the racially aggravated s.4 offence is included in case the jury 
6 As was pointed out at the time in Leng, Taylor and Wasik, Blackstone’s Guide to the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 pp 48-51 
7 Hansard, Lords, 17 March 1998, col 699 et seq 
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do not convict of violent disorder or affray, the jury will again be confronted with the 
paradox that the racial aggravation is something of which they have to be satisfied on 
the less serious charge (aggravated s.4) but not for the more serious charge of violent 
disorder or affray which does not have a specifically racially aggravated form. 
 
The test of racial (and religious) aggravation 
 
The 1998 Act set out the test of racial aggravation in s.28 as follows (the words in 
square brackets have been added to reflect the fact that religious aggravation was 
added as a result of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, s.39): 
 
“(1) An offence is racially [or religiously] aggravated for the purposes of sections 29-
32 below if- 
a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after dong 
so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility 
based on the victims membership  (or presumed membership) of a racial  
[or religious] group; or  
b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members 
of a racial [or religious] group based on their membership of that group” 
 
Section 28 can be seen to have created two separate types of racial aggravation in sub 
paragraphs a) and b); a) demonstrated racial hostility and b) racially hostile 
motivation which are alternative ways of proving the aggravating feature. 
 
The second form of aggravation, based on motivation, is the primary target of  the 
aggravated offences, seeking to  denounce, punish and deter the singling out of 
victims based on their membership of a racial  (or religious) group. It is also however 
quite difficult to prove as was explained in the Consultation Paper, Racial Violence 
and Harassment in 19978  
 
“Ministers recognise that the creation of offences which required the 
prosecution to prove that the offence was motivated on racial grounds would 
create a difficult hurdle to be overcome by the prosecutors. The prosecution 
would need to distinguish a racial motive from other possible motives and 
would have to demonstrate the degree to which a person had been influenced 
by various motives. There may be a whole range of different circumstances 
and motives at work in such cases and this may put a conviction in doubt for 
all but the most overtly racist incidents.” 
 
The government intends that the new offences should cover cases where the 
prosecution is able to show racial motivation but it believes that for most 
racial incidents of violence and harassment a much more realistic test will be 
necessary. 
 
The test of demonstrated racial hostility was explained in the next two paragraphs to 
be this “much more realistic” alternative test 
 
8 At paragraphs 8.2 to 8.3 
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…the new offences should be committed where it is shown …. that the 
offender demonstrated racial hostility at or around the time of the basic 
offence, or that the motivation for committing the offence was racial hostility. 
 
This sets the threshold for the new offences at a level which is likely to catch 
all the cases where there is any evidence of racism 
 
There are two ways of looking at the tactic of providing these two alternative ways of 
proving the aggravating feature. On the one hand the fact that aggravation is not 
totally dependent on proving the difficult matter of motivation answers some of the 
problems about the potential “chilling effect”  on free speech  since it lessens the 
temptation or necessity to rely on previous utterances of the defendant about racial 
matters as evidence of his racial motivation. To meet the alternative ground of 
demonstrated racial hostility, the words demonstrating racial hostility have to be 
uttered immediately before or after the violence or harassment and so represent a 
much more focussed limitation on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the 
demonstrated racial hostility ground moves quite a distance away from the core and 
most legitimate aim of distinguishing offences were the offender singled out his 
victim on racial (or religious) grounds to include cases where the offender happens to 
show in the course of committing an offence that he has racist views, whether or not 
they influenced him in committing the offence or choosing his victim. 
 
 Of course it will often be the case that a person who demonstrates racial hostility at 
the time of the offence was indeed committing the offence and selecting his victim 
because of those views i.e. was racially motivated, but this does not have to be shown.  
Some critics9 of the demonstrated racial hostility ground found it on these grounds to 
be  
 
“positively Orwellian in that it seeks to police people’s emotions. It increases 
maximum sentences by up to 300% for offences which have nothing to do 
initially with race or nationality and where there is no racial motivation but 
where, in the course of the attack, some hostility or resentment may emerge 
accidentally” 
 
On the other hand, it will often be the case that person who demonstrates racial 
hostility at the time of the offence is actually motivated by it in whole or in part and, 
perhaps equally importantly, this will be the perception of the victim of the offence 
whose distress and fear will thus be heightened as a result.  Thus the demonstrated 
racial hostility ground can be defended on the grounds that it will often be evidential 
of racial motivation and also that it aggravates the offence itself independently in any 
event in terms of the impact on the victim. As will be seen it is the demonstrated 
racial (or religious) hostility ground which has proved to be most important in 
practice as compared with the racial motivation ground of aggravation even though 
the demonstrated racial hostility aspect has itself not been without its own problems.  
 
 
The interpretation and application of the statutory provisions 
 
9 Lord Monson, Hansard, Lords, 12 February 1998, col 1266 
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A key concept under both of the alternative tests of racial aggravation set out in s.28(1) 
a) and b) above is that of membership of a “racial group.” Section 28(4) defines this 
as a “group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including 
citizenship) or ethnic or national origins.” This definition is almost identical to that 
used first in the Race Relations Act 1976 (which however did not include citizenship) 
and even closer to that used in the Public Order Act 1986 (the only difference being 
the order in which the words “race” and “colour” appear). The leading case under the 
1976 Act is the House of Lords decision in Mandla v Dowell Lee10 which established 
that for the purposes of unlawful discrimination, Sikhs constituted a group “defined 
by reference to …. ethnic origins” even it originated as a religious community since 
inter alia it had a long shared history, of which the group was conscious as 
distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it kept alive, and  it had 
a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners. This 
relatively broad approach to the meaning of racial group has been followed in a 
number of other discrimination cases so that Romany gipsies are recognised as racial 
group on account of their ethnic origin 11  and Irish Travellers have also been so 
recognised12. Whilst Rastafarians are not regarded as a racial group but rather as a 
religious group13 (one factor being in contrast to the Sikh history of several centuries, 
the Rastafarian  history was only of 60 years) the significance of this was removed by 
the addition in 2001 of religious aggravation on the grounds of membership of a 
religious group, religious group being defined, by a new subsection (5) inserted into 
s.28   of the 1998 Act, as “a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief 
or lack of religious belief”.  
 
The types of groups protected under the Act as interpreted in line with discrimination 
law and amended in 2001 were thus fairly wide and the interpretation given to the 
concept of racial group in criminal cases decided specifically under the 1998 Act 
tended to further develop the broad contextual approach of Mandla v Lee. The leading 
authority and clear illustration of this is the House of Lords case of Rogers14 where a 
line of cases was approved giving a broad context to “racial group. Thus in Director 
of Public Prosecutions v M 15  it had been held that “bloody foreigners” could, 
depending on the context, demonstrate hostility to a racial group and in A-G’s  
Reference (No 4 of 2004) 16 , the Court of Appeal held that “someone who is an 
immigrant to this country and therefore non-British” could be a member of a racial 
group for this purpose and in White (Anthony)17, it was held that “African” could 
demonstrate hostility to a racial group, because it would generally be taken to mean 
black African. In Rogers, Baroness Hale confirmed this line of cases and agreed with 
the submissions that  
 
“ …the statute intended a broad non-technical approach, rather than a 
construction which invited nice distinctions. Hostility may be demonstrated at 
the time, or immediately before or after, the offence is committed (section 
10 [1983] 2 AC 548 
11 Commission for Racial Equality v Dutton [1989] QB 783 
12 O’Leary v Punch Retail 29 August 2000 
13 Dawkins v. DoE  [1993] IRLR 284 CA 
14 [2007] 2 AC 62 
15 [2004] 1 WLR 2758 
16 [2005] 1 WLR 2810 
17 [2001] 1 WLR 1352 
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28(1)(a)). The victim may be presumed by the offender to be a member of the 
hated group even if she is not (section 28(1)(a)). Membership of a group 
includes association with members of that group (section 28(2)). And the fact 
that the offender's hostility is based on other factors as well racism or 
xenophobia is immaterial (section 28(3)).” 
 
Baroness Hale went on to comment that   
 
 “This flexible, non-technical approach makes sense, not only as a matter of 
language, but also in policy terms. The mischiefs attacked by the aggravated 
versions of these offences are racism and xenophobia. Their essence is the 
denial of equal respect and dignity to people who are seen as “other”. This is 
more deeply hurtful, damaging and disrespectful to the victims than the simple 
versions of these offences. It is also more damaging to the community as a 
whole, by denying acceptance to members of certain groups not for their own 
sake but for the sake of something they can do nothing about. This is just as 
true if the group is defined exclusively as it is if it is defined inclusively”. 
 
Notwithstanding the generally supportive and expansive approach of the House of 
Lords in Rogers (where doubt was cast on some anomalous and restrictive earlier 
decisions such as DPP v Pal18 ), the aggravated offences have not been without their 
difficulties in the five years since Rogers. Thus in SH19 the trial judge, in withdrawing   
an offence alleged to be aggravated by the expression of  the  words  “black monkey” 
said 
 
"I understand what the judges in the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal 
have to say about the theory behind the matter, as it were. But it seems to me 
that using one's common sense ... you have no chance of persuading a 
Woolwich jury to be sure that he said what he said as a result of hostility 
towards the man because of his race as opposed to personal dislike or loss of 
temper or both" 
 
On the prosecutions appeal against the ruling, the Court of Appeal ordered a retrial 
and, amongst other criticisms of the judge’s handling of the case, pointed out that  the 
judge completely missed the distinction between hostile motivation in s.28(1)(b) and 
demonstrated hostility in s.28(1)(a). This had been a common error in earlier years but 
has persisted despite the supportive analysis of the offences by the House of Lords in 
Rogers, and indeed, as the opening line of the quote above shows, in full knowledge 
of the appellate courts’ approach. 
 
SH might be dismissed as a case where the trial judge was clearly unsympathetic to 
the aims of the legislation  but Jones v DPP20 demonstrates the on-going difficulties 
which magistrates in particular  have had in conscientiously aiming to follow relevant 
case law. The defendant had, in a dispute with a neighbouring couple, referred to the 
wife’s presumed internet bride status. The magistrates read the earlier cases of DPP v 
Howard 21 and Johnson v DPP22 as requiring that not only did para (b),  racially 
18 [2000] Crim LR 756 
19 [2010] EWCA Crim 1931 
20 [2011] 1 WLR 833 
21 [2008] EWHC 608 (Admin) 
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hostile  motivation, require a subjective motive of hostility to a member of the 
relevant group but that para a),  demonstrated racial hostility, also required a 
subjective element inherent in the notion of hostility. The magistrates considered that 
D was actually motivated by (non-racial) hostility towards the husband because of an 
ongoing dispute rather by racial hostility to the wife and therefore  concluded that 
even the para a), demonstrated racial hostility, ground of aggravation was not made 
out. The Divisional Court corrected them on this and said  
 
  “limb (a) involves no examination of subjective intent or motivation behind 
the demonstration of racial hostility for the victim. It merely requires the 
demonstration of racial hostility. It contains an objective test of whether the 
defendant demonstrated racial hostility to the victim.” 
 
The legal difficulties inherent in the legislation, especially where offences are to be 
tried by magistrates are perhaps well illustrated by the following somewhat complex 
reasoning offered by the Ousely J in the Divisional Court in Jones v DPP23  
 
“The decision in the Howard case does not contradict what I have said 
because it was dealing exclusively with limb (b). The comment of Richards LJ 
in the Johnson case [2008] EWHC 509 draws upon the Howard case [2008] 
EWHC 608 but misapplies it obiter seemingly to a section 28(1)(a) case, to 
which it has no real application. The weight which would otherwise be 
attributed to this obiter has to be significantly qualified. As I have said, the 
decision in the RG case 168 JP 31 , which draws the distinction was not cited 
in the Johnson case. Accordingly, the justices misdirected themselves in law 
in requiring there to be motivation of racial hostility in order to convict of this 
offence under limb (a) of section 28 of the 1998 Act. 
 
If a Lord Justice of Appeal can misapply the case law  (seemingly both obiter and per 
incuriam) it is perhaps  not surprising that magistrates  have continued to misdirect 
themselves. This is not the place to try to review and explain all the detailed 
complexities of all of the case law on even just the racially aggravated offences but 
enough has hopefully been said to demonstrate that they cannot be regarded as simple 
or straightforward. It is in this context that one has to assess the question, recently 
referred to the Law Commission by the government and to which this paper now turns, 
of  whether the aggravated offences should be extended beyond racial and religious 
hostility to hostility on the ground of disability, sexual orientation and transgender 
identity.  
 
The potential extension of  the grounds of aggravation. 
 
It will be contended in this section that extension of the aggravated offences would  
be inappropriate and counter-productive and would only exacerbate existing 
difficulties by extending them to a wider category of  cases whilst at the same  time 
marginalising an even  broader range of potential grounds of aggravation. Instead it 
will be  argued that  a much more fruitful approach  would be  to  strengthen the 
provisions relating to sentencing of offences motivated by  (or demonstrating) 
22 [2008] EWHC 509 (Admin) 
23 At paragraph 23 
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hostility towards minority groups and indeed that, if this  were to be  done, far from it 
being desirable to extend the aggravated  offences it would be preferable  if  they were 
to  be  repealed. This last point may seem surprising at first glance and to constitute an 
retreat from the continuing strong public commitment to combat and  denounce racial 
and religious discrimination. However, given more effective provision and use of  
sentencing powers for any offence where  there is racial religious or any other 
relevant ground of aggravation, the existence of  a limited number  of specific 
aggravated offences is not only an unnecessary diversion  but  can actually operate as 
an unwelcome  complication in  dealing  effectively even  with factual situations 
which fall within those specific offences. These complications are clearly illustrated 
by the separate but inter-related cases of McGillivray 24  and O’Callaghan 25which 
concern  the question  of the extent of the mutual exclusivity between the aggravated 
offences and the duty (under CJA 2003, s 145)  to treat racial and religious hostility as 
a ground of aggravation for all other offences .  
 
McGillivray was a striking case of assault on a passer-by by means  of  an Alsatian 
dog (in Central London, Tavistock  Square, WC1) with seemingly very clear racial 
hostility expressed and demonstrated  by the defendant and resulting in four 
penetrating wounds to the victim’s thigh. The prosecution originally charged the 
defendant with the racially aggravated offence of assault occasioning actual bodily 
harm (contrary to s.29(1)(b) CDA 1998)  but the indictment was subsequently 
amended to include  a second count of the basic offence of assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm under s.47 of the OAPA 1861 to which the defendant pleaded guilty. No 
evidence was offered on the racially aggravated offence of which he was formally 
found not guilty. However, the recorder in sentencing for the basic offence said that 
he regarded the offence as clearly racially aggravated and sentenced the  defendant to 
three  years26 instead of the two years  that he would have found appropriate if there 
had not been racial aggravation. Stanley Burnton J in the Court of Appeal ruled that it 
was not open to the recorder, irrespective of the view he took of the facts, to sentence 
the appellant on the basis that he was in fact guilty of a racially aggravated assault of 
which he had been found not guilty.   
 
Some of the complications in this area have arisen because the facts of the case do not 
squarely raise the issue of whether the power to increase the sentence for racial 
aggravation under what is now s.145 is available where the substantive aggravated 
offence under CDA has not actually been charged. It is one thing to say, if you  are 
charged with the aggravated offence, and no  evidence is offered and you  are then 
acquitted of that offence, that you  cannot  be  then sentenced for the basic offence  on 
the basis that in fact the offence was racially aggravated. To do that would be unfair 
and unacceptable and that is what  McGillivray clearly does decide. However, in the  
commentary to the case in the Criminal Law Review27 it is said that it 
 
24 [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 60 
25 [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 83 
26 Note that this was still within the 5 year maximum for the basic offence under s.47 and so did not 
come close to using the extra 2 years which would have been available for the aggravated offence. The 
need to make the extra two years available  was supposed to have been the main criterion for selecting 
which  offences should be available in aggravated  form (and for not having an aggravated version of 
s.18 for example)  but it seems generally that  few cases result in a higher sentence than the maximum 
available for the basic offence. 
27 [2005] Crim LR 484 at 486 
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“does not appear that this element [that the aggravated offence was  charged 
but not proceeded with] was crucial to the decision, and the same result should 
logically follow if the offender were charged with the basic version of the 
offence as in O’Callaghan (below)”  
 
Before turning to O’Callaghan, it is perhaps worth observing, contrary to the 
commentary quoted  above, that it  does in fact  seem integral  to McGillivray in  its 
own  terms that not only was the aggravated offence originally charged and not 
proceeded with but a verdict of not guilty of that  offence was recorded. Stanley 
Burnton J did not say you cannot be sentenced  for an offence of  which you have not 
been found  guilty but that  you cannot be  sentenced for   an offence of which you 
have been found not guilty, which of course is a different matter. The commentary on 
McGillivray in its turn  influences the interpretation generally given to O’Callaghan 
which is commented on as the next case in the  Criminal Law Review28. 
 
In O’Callaghan, there never was a charge of the aggravated offence, the basic offence 
of assault was charged from the outset and there was no express suggestion of racial 
aggravation in the course of the trial. Neither was there a Newton hearing and racial 
aggravation was not raised with defence counsel before mitigation. The trial judge 
however indicated in sentencing that he considered that there must have been racial  
aggravation for which factor he increased the sentence from  15 months to 18 months. 
The Court of Appeal again ruled that he was wrong to do so but it  is not at all clear 
that the case is authority for the proposition, for which it is often  cited29, that a court 
should not  treat an offence as racially or religiously aggravated if a racially or 
religiously form of the offence was available but was not charged. 
 
It is true that at para 17 of Gross J’s judgement in the Court of Appeal it was 
acknowledged that 
 
“there is much to be said for the point as to principle raised by the single judge, 
namely that if the racially aggravated assault could have been but was not 
charged, then it would be wrong to increase the sentence on account of racial 
aggravation”  
 
but the paragraph concluded  
 
However, on the view we take of the matter it is unnecessary to go that far and 
determine any such points of principle. In any event, there are situations where 
a Newton hearing is undoubtedly appropriate for the determination of facts 
relevant to sentence but which were irrelevant to guilt. Moreover, there is the 
apparently mandatory wording of s.153 of the PCC(S) Act 2000 for offences 
not within ss.29 to 32 of the CDA 1998. 
 
This latter reference to s.153 PCC(S) is to what is now s.145 CJA 2003 which states 
that  a court “must”  treat racial aggravation as an aggravating factor  on sentence for 
an offence “other than one under sections 29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 
28 At 486-488 
29 In addition to the commentary on McGillivray quoted above, see e.g. Anthony and Berryman’s 
Magistrates’ Court Guide (2013) para B5.2B where, however, the negative proposition is at least 
qualified by the word “normally”. 
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1998”. The offences under ss.29 -32 are thus the (mutually excluded) aggravated 
offences, not their underlying basic offences under OAPA 1861 or CDA 1971 etc for 
which latter offences, in contrast, the sentencer has to treat racial aggravation as an 
aggravating feature. Hence the reference in O’Callaghan to “the apparently mandatory 
wording” of what is now s.145 requiring racial aggravation to be treated as an 
aggravating factor. The Court therefore then went on in para 18 to say (italics added) 
 
We therefore prefer to proceed on the assumption that the question of racial 
aggravation could have been dealt with as part of the sentencing process, even 
though it had not arisen during the trial. Even on this assumption, we have no 
doubt that the course followed by the judge was, with respect, wrong in 
principle and unsustainable. In our judgment, where the question of racial 
aggravation has not arisen at trial, then even when it is open to the sentencer to 
pass an increase on the ground of racial aggravation (as we are prepared to 
assume it was here) either a Newton hearing must be held or, at the very least, 
plain and adequate notice must be given by the sentencer that he is considering 
sentencing on an enhanced or aggravated basis. 
 
Thus O’Callaghan is not an authority for saying that racial aggravation should not be 
considered at the sentencing stage where a racially aggravated offence could have 
been, but was not, charged and indeed it suggests that it probably can be and indeed 
that the wording of s.145 appears to require it to be30. What it does make clear 
however that if the racial aggravation is not part of the offence charged (i.e. the 
offence is not charged as an aggravated one under ss29-32 CDA 1998) and the 
racially aggravating features have not been rehearsed during the trial then a Newton 
hearing or some other form of notice must be given to the accused and to counsel to at 
least allow submissions to be made.  
 
For completeness, reference should also be made to the case of Kentsch31 where the 
Court of Appeal again  reduced a sentence for s.47 OAPA 1861, inter alia because the 
sentencing judge had referred to racial aggravation as an aggravating factor. However, 
like McGillivray, this was a case where a count for the racially aggravated version had 
been included but then withdrawn from the indictment and there was also a co-
accused who had pleaded guilty to the unaggravated offence and it was not 
established on the evidence from which defendant any demonstrated racial hostility 
had emanated. Clearly there could be no question in these circumstances of 
sentencing one defendant, the appellant, on the basis of racial aggravation which had 
not been proven against him. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The case law discussed above demonstrates considerable difficulties, even where 
there is fairly clear evidence of racial aggravation, in prosecuting aggravated offences 
The prosecution cannot be sure in advance whether they will be able to make out the 
racial aggravation at the trial and defendants may be unwilling to plead guilty to the 
30 This interpretation does not make the racially aggravated offences completely redundant or 
necessarily pointless since the higher maximum sentence is not available in the absence of the 
aggravated offence. Again it should be recalled that the main criterion for the selection of the offences 
to be enacted in aggravated form was whether there was a need to make available a higher maximum. 
31 [2005] EWCA Crim 2851 
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aggravated offence but may be prepared to plead to the basic offence as happened in 
both McGillivray and Kentsch. The prosecution may be then tempted to accept the 
plea (rightly or wrongly) and in these circumstances it is clear that the appellant 
cannot be sentenced for racial aggravation when he has been formally acquitted (as in 
McGillivray) of the aggravated offence or where the aggravated offence has been 
removed from the indictment on which he was first arraigned (as in Kentsch). 
Notwithstanding these cases and their misinterpretation along with the 
misunderstanding of O’Callaghan (to the extent that it has been taken to mean almost 
the opposite of what it actually says about the degree of mutual exclusivity), it should 
be and is open to the court to sentence for racial (or religious) aggravation where a 
racially aggravated offence could have been but was not charged in the first place 
(especially if the evidence of racial aggravation only emerges during the trial). This of 
course must be subject to the proviso that the accused is given the chance to respond 
to the racial aggravation allegation either through a Newton hearing or (at the very 
least) through his counsel’s speech in mitigation. However, the fact that the true 
import of cases such as McGillivray and O’Callaghan has not been properly 
understood (or is at least contestable and varies according to the precise way in which 
proceedings have been conducted) is itself a demonstration of the undue complexity 
introduced by having both a number of specific aggravated offences and also a 
general aggravating provision dealing with the same aspects of aggravation but with 
an unclear degree of mutual exclusivity. The logical conclusion is that there should 
either be a series of aggravating offences OR there should be a provision requiring the 
aggravating factors to be included in sentencing but not both. If there has to be a 
choice between one route or the other, it is submitted that the best choice is the 
sentencing provision.  
The reasons for this include; 
 
a) the original choice of offences in the CDA 1998 was  arbitrary and included e.g. 
s.20 OAPA 1861 but  did not include the closely related s.18 and this has created 
anomalies and problems in relation to selection of charge and alternative verdicts 
as discussed above; 
b) the difficulties that magistrates in particular have had in understanding the nature 
of the two modes of aggravation – demonstrated racial hostility and racially 
hostile motivation – and the relationship between them – see the discussion of  
SH and related cases  above; 
c) the likely increase in difficulties of the above nature, and the increasing number 
of cases evidencing such difficulties, if the grounds of aggravation in the specific 
offences were to be extended to include hostility on  the grounds of disability, 
sexual orientation and transgender identity 
d) the potential problem that the more grounds of aggravation that are specifically 
recognised in the aggravating offences, the more anomalous it may seem that 
other potential victim groups are not included (such as those based on age, sex, or 
other social groups (e.g. Goths – see the Sophie Lancaster case discussed below.). 
Whilst it is true that the same criticism might be made of a measure providing for 
aggravated sentencing rather than aggravated offences (i.e. that the groups 
referred to  and protected are limited and exclude other groups equally deserving 
of protection) this consideration is not quite as telling in the case of a sentencing 
provision given that there is any event a much wider basis of aggravation outside 
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ss145/145 CJA in the form of the general sentencing guideline, the relevant part of 
which is as follows32 
 
Sentencing Guidelines Council 
  Overarching principles; Seriousness  
“D. The Assessment of Culpability and Harm … 
i) Aggravating factors ….. 
1.22 Factors indicating higher culpability:  
…… 
Offence  motivated by hostility towards a minority group, or a member 
or members of it”  
 
Of course this is not quite the same as the broader nature of aggravation first 
introduced in the CDA 1998 since it only talks about “motivated by” and thus is 
effectively limited to cases where motivation can be proved as opposed to the more 
commonly relied on form of aggravation under the 1998 Act of “demonstrated … 
hostility” where the subjective element of motivation does not have to be shown. 
Nevertheless there is considerable scope for this guideline to be used much more than 
it is, or where it is used, for its use to be publicised and recorded and declared in open 
court. There are very few reported cases on its direct or express use (see e.g. Taylor33 
where it arguably need not and should not have been referred to as the offence was 
itself an aggravated one under CDA 1998.) The highly publicised Sophie Lancaster 
trial is a much better known case where the general guideline was in effect used 
(although the fact that it was so used is not always appreciated). This case in fact 
provides a tragic  but powerful example of the right way to deal with such cases albeit 
that the usage could be put into a rather clearer statutory framework within which  the 
grounds of  aggravation might be more clearly signalled as being relevant. 
 
In the Sophie Lancaster case34  the sentencing remarks of the Recorder of Preston, 
Judge Anthony Russell QC, were quoted with approval in the Court of Appeal:35  
 
“I am satisfied that the only reason for this wholly unprovoked attack, was that 
Robert Maltby and Sophie Lancaster were singled out for their appearance 
alone because they looked and dressed differently from you and your friends. I 
regard this as a serious aggravating feature of this case, which is to be equated 
with other hate crimes such as those where people of different races, religions, 
or sexual orientation are attacked because they are different. This aggravating 
feature applies to all of you and I add that the courts are perfectly capable of 
recognising and taking account of such aggravating features without the 
necessity of Parliament enacting legislation to instruct us to do so. 
 
These remarks related to convictions of two defendants  for murder, and of a further 
three for s.18 OAPA 1861, arising from a savage and unprovoked attack on two 
32 http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_seriousness_guideline.pdf 
33 [2009] EWCA Crim 532 – see also  Killeen 2009 EWCA Crim 711 where arguably it was s.145 
which should have been used since it was  case of racial hostility – an Irish traveller case –  and see 
further the original case  formulating this aspect of the guideline -  Celaire  [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 
116 where the example given of hostility to a minority group was racial hostility within s.28 CDA 1998! 
34Ryan Herbert and others [2009] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 9   
35 At paragraph 20 
14 
 
                                                 
young people whose appearance as Goths appeared to be the only reason for singling 
them out. In relation to murder, the relevant  statutory provision in Schedule 21 CJA 
2003 only specifically mentions  the racial, religious, disability, sexual orientation and 
transgender forms of aggravation and s.18 is governed by s.145/146 CJA 2003 which 
provisions similarly only cover effectively the same  grounds of aggravation. 
However, both offences are in effect covered by the general sentencing guideline on 
aggravating features which refers to “hostility towards a minority group” and thus the 
approval of Judge Russell’s remarks can be seen as a powerful endorsement of the 
potential of the minority group aggravating feature. 
 
Overall, it is submitted that the most effective, simple and transparent way forward in 
this area should be by way of aggravating factors to be used at the sentencing stage 
rather than by means of any extension of the existing aggravated offences. The 
aggravating sentencing factors mentioned in s.145 CJA 2003 could themselves be 
more effectively used if there were not the complications of considering the question 
of their interrelationship with the specific aggravated offences, and in particular the 
mutual exclusivity question of whether a basic offence can be treated as aggravated 
for sentencing purposes on racial or religious grounds where an aggravated offence 
could have been preferred from the outset. The abolition (rather than extension) of the 
aggravated offences would not only remove these problems (and any further 
extension of them) but would allow a single unified aggravating sentence provision to 
be enacted referring to all the groups currently covered by s.145/146. Furthermore this 
general aggravating provision could also be widened to encompass, and thereby more 
clearly signal, a more generic “minority group” criterion, which already exists  in the 
general sentencing guideline and in the practice of the courts as endorsed by the Court 
of Appeal in  Ryan Herbert. Although the removal of the aggravated offences first 
enacted in 1998 might seem to be a backward step to some eyes36, the difficulties 
inherent in their application and in their relationship to the aggravating factors in 
sentencing, mean that their demise would be more than compensated by a broader and 
more clearly articulated sentencing provision. This would provide for aggravation at 
the sentencing stage on a broader range of aggravating grounds, consistently with the 
existing general sentencing guideline, irrespective of the underlying offence 
committed and all the more effective for not having the complicating features of the 
substantive offences, including their anomalous grounds of selection and their 
(apparent) mutual exclusivity.37  
36 Sometimes a seemingly backward step is necessary in order to open up a more attractive route 
forward. An analogy might also be drawn with tax law and in particular with the relief for mortgage 
interest on the principal private residence that at one time was given. The effect of this relief was 
beneficial to those initially in receipt but in the long term it merely put up the price of houses to the 
disadvantage of subsequent purchasers, particularly first time buyers. The phenomenon is known to 
economists as tax capitalisation. Ultimately the tax relief was abolished amongst much initial grief 
from householders but in the longer term it is now hardly remarked upon. Similarly it might be said 
that the initial enactment of the racially aggravated offences was a good thing in that it sent out a 
particular message but the initial benefits have now disappeared because of the complications that the 
offences have brought with them and the increasing pressure to include other grounds of aggravation. 
The  denunciatory effect of the original provisions has thus been capitalised (i.e. in this context has 
become ossified) and whilst removing them would no doubt be criticised initially, in the longer term a 
clearer signal would ultimately be sent by having a more simple, effective and better articulated 
sentencing provision covering all the relevant grounds of aggravation without the complication of the 
relationship with a limited number of aggravated offences.  
37 A draft of this article was submitted to the Law Commission by way of a response to its Consultation 
Paper No 213 Hate Crime:The Case for Extending the Existing Offences (2013). 
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